Illegal Tender:  Antiquities Protection and U.S. Import Restrictions on Cypriot Coinage by Kelly, Derek R.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 34 | Issue 2 Article 6
2009
Illegal Tender: Antiquities Protection and U.S.
Import Restrictions on Cypriot Coinage
Derek R. Kelly
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Derek R. Kelly, Illegal Tender: Antiquities Protection and U.S. Import Restrictions on Cypriot Coinage, 34 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol34/iss2/6
ILLEGAL TENDER: ANTIQUITIES 
PROTECTION AND U.S. IMPORT 
RESTRICTIONS ON CYPRIOT COINAGE 
INTRODUCTION 
n one of the Bush administration’s final acts before leaving office, 
the United States concluded an agreement with China that banned 
the import of Chinese antiquities into the United States.1 This agreement, 
known as a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”), was the most re-
cent of fourteen bilateral accords the United States has signed with other 
countries for the avowed purpose of protecting cultural heritage.2 One 
important aspect of the new agreement with China is the inclusion of a 
number of ancient coin-types among the protected materials.3 This is sig-
nificant because it is only the second time that an MOU has included 
coins and demonstrates the increasing breadth of these agreements as the 
United States attempts to use cultural heritage protection for political 
gain. 
Another example of the United States’ use of antiquities protection for 
political motives, and the focus of this Note, is the first MOU to include 
coins: the agreement concluded between the United States and Cyprus on 
July 16, 2007.4 The accord extended a pre-existing MOU between the 
                                                                                                             
 1. Randy Kennedy, Pact on Chinese Treasures Wins Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2009. 
 2. See U.S. State Department, International Cultural Property Protection, http:// 
culturalheritage.state.gov/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). For a full list of coun-
tries with agreements with the United States, see U.S. State Department, Implementation, 
http://culturalheritage.state.gov/implemen.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). 
 3. Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material from China, 74 
Fed. Reg. 2838, 2842 (Jan. 16, 2009). 
 4. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions 
on Pre-Classical and Classical Archaeological Objects and Byzantine Period Ecclesias-
tical and Ritual Ethnological Material, U.S.-Cyprus, July 16, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 86 (2007), 
available at http://culturalheritage.state.gov/CyprusExt2007AmendedAgreement.pdf [he-
reinafter 2007 MOU]. A former British colony that gained its independence in 1960, Cy-
prus has struggled with tensions between its ethnic Greek majority and ethnic Turkish 
minority since its founding. In 1974, these tensions came to a head with a Greek-
sponsored attempt to seize control of the government. In response, the Turkish govern-
ment intervened militarily and soon gained control of one-third of the island. In 1983, the 
Turkish-controlled area declared its independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, but, to date, only Turkey has recognized it. Despite several attempts at reconcili-
ation sponsored by the United Nations and European Union (of which the entire island is 
officially a member) the island remains divided. Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact 
Book: Cyprus, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html 
[hereinafter Fact Book] (last visited Dec. 21, 2007). For the purposes of this Note, the 
Cypriot government is the generally recognized Greek majority government of the Re-
I 
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two countries that imposed import restrictions on pre-classical and clas-
sical archaeological objects and Byzantine ecclesiastical and ritual ethno-
logical material from the island nation.5 In effect for five years, the new 
MOU extends the previous agreement that the two countries signed in 
2002.6 There is, however, one notable addition in the 2007 agreement: 
“[w]e note that the subcategory Coins of Cypriot Types has been added 
to the category entitled Metal . . . .”7 
The inclusion of coins among the other restricted objects, such as stat-
uary and architectural elements, was unprecedented8 and, as this Note 
will argue, has wide-ranging ramifications for the protection of cultural 
heritage both above and below the ground. In particular, this Note will 
suggest that political, rather than archaeological, concerns are the driving 
force behind the MOU and its inclusion of coinage. 
One of the primary purposes behind restrictions on the trade of cultu-
rally significant objects is the prevention of the destruction of archaeo-
logical sites and the protection of source countries’ cultural heritage.9 
According to the Federal Register Notice, coins, in particular, were in-
cluded in the restriction because they “constitute an inseparable part of 
the archaeological record of [Cyprus], and . . . are vulnerable to pillage 
and illicit export.”10 The new restriction applies to “[c]oins of Cypriot 
types made of gold, silver, and bronze” dating from the sixth century 
                                                                                                             
public of Cyprus. The bilateral agreement with the United States was signed with this 
government, but its terms apply to antiquities from throughout the island. 
 5. Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Pre-Classical and Classical Arc-
haeological Objects and Byzantine Period Ecclesiastical and Ritual Ethnological Material 
from Cyprus, 72 Fed. Reg. 38,470 (July 16, 2007) [hereinafter Extension of Import Re-
strictions]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Three previous requests to include coins in MOUs were rejected by the Cultural 
Property Advisory Committee (“CPAC”), the group charged with advising the U.S. State 
Department regarding cultural object import restrictions. Interestingly, among these was a 
request made by Cyprus five years ago. The other two requests were from Italy. Wayne 
G. Sayles, IAPN Questions State Department Actions, July 30, 2007, http://www.accg.us/ 
issues/news/iapn-questions-state-department-actions. On April 30, 2008, the Department 
of Homeland Security included coinage in new import restrictions on Iraqi archaeological 
and ethnological materials. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological and Ethno-
logical Material of Iraq, 73 Fed Reg. 23,338 (Apr. 30, 2008). 
 9. See United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization, Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Own-
ership of Cultural Property art. 2, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion]; Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13 
(2000). 
 10. Extension of Import Restrictions, supra note 5, at 38,471. 
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BCE to 235 CE11 and prohibits their importation into the United States 
unless they have an export permit issued by the Cypriot government or 
“verifiable documentation that they left Cyprus prior to the effective date 
of the restriction.”12 Due to the past practice of coin collecting, especially 
the lack of documentation that accompanies coins and their wide geo-
graphic dispersal in antiquity,13 the restriction will make most Cypriot-
types coins vulnerable to seizure by the government or restitution lawsuits. 
Interested parties have both praised and vilified the new MOU’s inclu-
sion of Cypriot-type coins.14 Cypriot politicians have praised the new 
agreement because it strengthens the protection of their nation’s cultural 
patrimony.15 Archaeologists and proponents of strong export/import 
laws, which are designed to eliminate the market for antiquities, also 
strongly support the new MOU, seeing it as an important step in stem-
ming the looting of archaeological sites.16 Alternatively, a number of in-
dividuals, particularly American coin collectors and dealers, are vehe-
ment in their opposition to the inclusion of coins in the new agreement. 
Arguments as diverse as due process violations during the decision-
making process,17 violations of EU law in allowing Cyprus to impose 
such restrictions,18 civil servant misconduct,19 and the operation of a se-
cretive “anticollection cabal”20 have been raised. 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. at 38,473. 
 12. U.S. State Department, U.S. Protection of Pre-Classical and Classical Archaeo-
logical Material and Byzantine Period Ecclesiastical and Ritual Ethnological Material, 
http://culturalheritage.state.gov/cyfactpc.html [hereinafter Cyprus Archaeological Mate-
rials Information Page] (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). 
 13. See infra Part I.C. 
 14. Jeremy Kahn, U.S. Imposes Restrictions on Importing Cypriot Coins, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 2007. 
 15. Nicholas Burns, Under Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State & Andreas Kakouris, Ambas-
sador of Cyprus, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony: Preserving the Cultural, Archaeolog-
ical, and Religious Heritage of Cyprus (July 19, 2007) (on file with Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law). 
 16. See, e.g., Letter from C. Brian Rose, President, Archaeological Inst. of Am., to 
CPAC (Feb. 3, 2007), http://archaeological.org/webinfo.php?page=10402; Letter from 
Patty Gerstenblith, President, Lawyer’s Comm. for Cultural Heritage Prot. (Jan. 29, 
2007) http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/archaeologywatch/CyprusRenewal.pdf. 
 17. Peter K. Tompa & David Welsh, Import Restrictions Imposed on Cypriot Coins, 
Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.accg.us/issues/news/import-restrictions-imposed-on-cypriot-
coins?searchterm=cypriot+. 
 18. Letter from Dr. Hubert Lanz, President, Fed’n of European Numismatic Trade 
Ass’ns, to U.S. State Dep’t (July 25, 2007), http://www.accg.us/issues/news/fenap-ex 
presses-concern-to-us-state-department/. 
 19. Sayles, supra note 8. 
 20. David Welsh, Stealth UNIDROIT: The State Department’s War on Collecting, 
ANCIENT COINS, Aug. 1, 2007, http://classicalcoins.blogspot.com/2007/08/stealth-unidroit-
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Though some of these critiques of the new MOU are somewhat exag-
gerated, there are legitimate objections to the restriction on coins and the 
policies that the United States and Cyprus are employing in the fight 
against looting. On a practical level, these objects very rarely carry the 
same kind of provenance21 documentation as other archaeological ma-
terial. As a result, it will be very difficult to establish which coins can be 
properly imported and which cannot. Furthermore, customs officials will 
find it difficult to identify “Cypriot-types” coins properly without exten-
sive training. There are even suggestions that the images that the State 
Department posted to instruct customs agents on how to identify Cypriot-
types coins contain important errors,22 further compromising the en-
forcement of the legislation. These objections, however, only address the 
practicality of the restriction rather than the more fundamental question: 
are export and import restrictions the most effective means of curbing the 
looting of archaeological sites? 
Many archaeologists and politicians from source nations23 favor strict 
laws that prohibit the export, import, and even ownership of antiquities. 
There are two primary reasons they cite. First is the prevention of the 
illicit removal of antiquities (promoted by archaeologists), and second is 
the retention of cultural materials for nationalistic and political reasons 
                                                                                                             
state-departments-war.html (“If this unholy cabal of narrow academic interests, en-
trenched bureaucrats and cultural officials in a few foreign nations can secretively and 
successfully hijack U.S. cultural policy in such a manner, the implications may reach far 
beyond what happens to coin collecting. . . . This development should concern not only 
coin collectors, but also every American citizen who values his or her personal free-
dom.”). 
 21. For a discussion of the meaning of “provenance,” see infra Part II.C. 
 22. Peter K. Tompa, Slapdash Effort at DOS, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.accg.us/ 
issues/world/slapdash-effort-at-dos/. 
 23. Though imperfect, the terms “source” nation and “market” nation, coined by John 
Henry Merryman, are helpful and often used in the cultural property debate. As Merry-
man defines them: 
[T]he world divides itself into source nations and market nations. In source na-
tions, the supply of desirable cultural property exceeds the internal demand. 
Nations like Mexico, Egypt, Greece and India are obvious examples. They are 
rich in cultural artifacts beyond any conceivable local use. In market nations, 
the demand exceeds the supply. France, Germany, Japan, the Scandinavian na-
tions, Switzerland and the United States are examples. Demand in the market 
nation encourages export from the source nations. When, as is often (but not 
always) the case, the source nation is relatively poor and the market nation 
wealthy, an unrestricted market will encourage the net export of cultural prop-
erty. 
John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 
832 [hereinafter Two Ways of Thinking]. 
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(favored by politicians in source countries). Of the two, the protection of 
archaeological sites from pillaging is the more compelling justification.24 
Looting is incredibly destructive and is responsible for the irretrievable 
loss of precious contextual information fundamental to archaeological 
research.25 It is undisputed that the value of an archaeological object is 
far greater than its inherent beauty.26 As Renfrew and Bahn state, “A 
looted vase may be an attractive object for a collector, but far more could 
have been learnt about the society that produced it had archaeologists 
been able to record where it was found . . . and in association with what 
other artifacts or organic remains.”27 Each time an object is looted, this 
context is destroyed, not only for the object looted, but also for all those 
around it and possibly for the entire site. Because archaeological objects 
and context are finite resources, even the smallest degree of destruction 
can lead to an irreplaceable loss. 
All concerned agree that the prevention of looting and its consequent 
destruction is a worthwhile goal.28 Many source nations and archaeolog-
ists are the strongest supporters of export and import restrictions as a 
means of preserving antiquities in context. They consider themselves “at 
war” with the market and argue that collecting antiquities is the equiva-
lent of looting. They believe that the only way to stop the pillaging of 
archaeological sites is to create a legal system29 and moral consensus that 
the trade in antiquities is akin to the trade in ivory or rare birds’ eggs.30   
                                                                                                             
 24. COLIN RENFREW, LOOT, LEGITIMACY AND OWNERSHIP 20 (2000) (“While some 
national governments may still take the rather chauvinist view that ownership and posses-
sion of significant artefacts (within their territorial borders) is of primary importance, 
most now realise that the true disaster is the illicit excavation.”). 
 25. In archaeology, “context consists of its immediate matrix (the material surround-
ing it, usually some sort of sediment such as gravel, sand, or clay), its provenience (hori-
zontal and vertical position within the matrix), and its association with other finds (occur-
rence together with other archaeological remains, usually in the same matrix).” COLIN 
RENFREW & PAUL BAHN, ARCHAEOLOGY: THEORIES METHODS AND PRACTICE 50 (3rd ed. 
2000) (emphasis omitted). 
 26. RENFREW, supra note 24, at 19–20. 
 27. RENFREW & BAHN, supra note 25, at 50. For an example of the importance of 
context, see RENFREW, supra note 18, at 22–26. 
 28. See, e.g., Sayles, supra note 8 (citing the International Association of Professional 
Numismatists Code of Ethics, which states that Members will “never knowingly deal in 
any numismatic item that has been illegally removed from an official excavation site”); 
ANCIENT COIN COLLECTORS GUILD, CODE OF ETHICS (2005), available at http://www.accg. 
us/issues/news/code (“Coin Collectors and Sellers will not knowingly purchase coins 
illegally removed from scheduled archaeological sites . . . and will comply with all cul-
tural property laws of their own country.”). 
 29. John Henry Merryman, A Licit Trade in Cultural Objects, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 3, 31 (Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds., 
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It appears unlikely, however, that the trade in antiquities will ever be-
come as stigmatized as the exploitation of endangered species. Objects 
that are now antiquities were always intended by their makers as items of 
exchange and, therefore, entail less flouting of moral impulses. Also, 
although the destruction of an archaeological site is lamentable, it is rea-
sonable to elevate the protection of endangered species (which entails the 
protection of life) over the protection of archaeological sites. Therefore, 
for the time being, it appears that the antiquities market will continue.31 
It is unclear, however, whether export and import restrictions are ac-
tually effective in deterring the looting of archaeological sites. As Pro-
fessor Bator has suggested, “Most current export control systems are 
self-destructive. The international black market thrives because no alter-
native is allowed to exist for either buyers or sellers, so that all economic 
incentives are pushed in favor of the illegal trade.”32 
Several alternative solutions to export and import restrictions have 
been suggested, most based on the premise that restrictions on the licit 
trade in antiquities creates a greater incentive for an illicit market, which, 
in turn, is fed by looting. Among these alternatives are suggestions for a 
more liberalized antiquities market,33 increased direct regulation of the 
market through antiquities registration, greater criminal penalties for loo-
ters and smugglers,34 increased indirect regulation of the market through 
instruments like museum taxation,35 and a return to the partage system.36 
                                                                                                             
1996). This argument, however, is somewhat weakened by the recent U.N.-approved 
international ivory sale in Namibia. Alan Cowell, Ivory for Sale, Legally (and Controver-
sially), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008. This demonstrates that even objects that appear to 
have stronger moral support for their protection, a legal, though admittedly controversial, 
market still exists. 
 30. See RENFREW, supra note 24, at 20. 
 31. For example, a recent Time Magazine article’s title proclaims “Antiquities: The 
Hottest Investment.” The article suggests that antiquities are an excellent investment and 
for under $10,000 a year, collectors can acquire a few quality pieces with an average 
increase in value of eight to nine percent annually. Maria Baugh, Antiquities: The Hottest 
Investment, TIME, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1693 
792,00.html. 
 32. Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 
318 (1982). 
 33. See, e.g., John Boardman, Who Owns Antiquities? Review of Jonathan Tokeley, 
Rescuing the Past: The Cultural Heritage Crusade, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.jonathan 
tokeley.com/default.asp?Display=38; Merryman, supra note 29. 
 34. S.M.R. MACKENZIE, GOING, GOING, GONE: REGULATING THE MARKET IN ILLICIT 
ANTIQUITIES (2005). 
 35. Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market In Antiquities: Reducing 
the Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 192–94 (2007). 
 36. JAMES CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY? 14 (2008); RENFREW, supra note 24, at 21. 
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Ancient coinage is particularly important to this debate because of coi-
nage’s unique nature compared to other antiquities. Coins’ archaeologi-
cal value, such as their use in dating archeological sites,37 compels au-
thorities to do their utmost to protect their archaeological context. On the 
other hand, unlike many other prized objects, coins differ conceptually, 
as they were created to be items of exchange. Furthermore, coins have a 
long history as collectables, but rarely bear provenance information. Ac-
cordingly, there are innumerable ancient coins in private and public col-
lections for which the owners cannot prove their provenance. Finally, 
import restrictions on coins are difficult to enforce, because of their por-
tability and size, which make them easy to smuggle or mail. These fac-
tors make coins unique among antiquities and suggest that their regula-
tion is more problematic, both practically and philosophically, than that 
of other objects. Accordingly, the question is whether or not the current 
rigid restriction on Cypriot coins is the most effective means of deterring 
illegal looting. 
Much of the debate regarding import and export restrictions has been 
highly polarized, with the media portraying the debate as a question be-
tween stopping looters versus infringing on the rights of U.S. citizens.38 
The dangerous mixture of nationalism, scholarly interest, the admiration 
of beauty, and the awe and respect for our shared history acts as a cata-
lyst for the clash of passionate points of view. 
This Note argues that strict restrictions on the importation of Cypriot 
coins is less than ideal and may, in fact, be counterproductive. Until there 
is greater regulation of the antiquities market, particularly through strict 
requirements regarding the recording of provenance, import restrictions 
will be easily flouted and may drive a greater proportion of the market 
towards illicit antiquities, which, in turn, will foster increased looting. 
More balanced solutions are required to combat the illicit antiquities 
trade and the looting of archaeological sites. 
Finally, there needs to be a shift in the debate regarding antiquities pro-
tection. The politicized discourse only serves to cloud the primary pur-
pose of antiquities legislation: the protection of archaeological context. 
Moreover, there are suggestions that the United States may be using an-
tiquities legislation to garner favor with source countries.39 Cyprus, in 
                                                                                                             
 37. See infra Part II.A. 
 38. See Jeremy Kahn, Is the U.S. Protecting Foreign Artifacts? Don’t Ask., N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007 (“[A]rchaeologists . . . say the art market fosters the looting of his-
toric sites, and dealers . . . say that broad import restrictions threaten collecting by private 
individuals and museums in the United States.”). 
 39. CUNO, supra note 36, at 35–36. 
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particular, may be a target because of its important role in the “War on 
Terror,” the Iraq invasion, and Turkey’s entry into the European Union. 
This Note advocates an increased focus on realistic, nuanced ap-
proaches to the protection of archaeological context and a shift away 
from politically driven regulatory regimes towards ones that focus on the 
actual protection of antiquities. Part I summarizes the importance of coi-
nage in the archaeological context, the long history of coin collecting, 
and the difficulty of regulating the trade in coins. Part II reviews the ex-
isting U.S. and Cypriot legislative regimes used in the fight against loot-
ing. Part III analyzes the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the current 
legislation in protecting archaeological sites from looting. Part IV ex-
amines alternative solutions to the looting problem and assesses whether 
their adoption is worth considering. Part V questions whether political 
motivations are affecting the U.S. and Cypriot anti-looting approaches. 
I. COINS IN THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND COLLECTING CONTEXTS 
A. The Archaeological Importance of Coins 
Ancient coins are not only inherently valuable but also critically im-
portant to archaeological research.40 First struck in western Turkey in the 
late seventh century BCE and minted in vast quantities ever since, coins 
have long been an essential part of organized society and, therefore, 
serve as an essential piece of the historical record.41 Ancient coins are 
found in a variety of different contexts, each of which serves as a valua-
ble source of information on ancient cultures. This is particularly true 
when they are found in situ.42 Coins discovered in context can help arc-
haeologists research trade and travel networks, locations of heavily traf-
ficked areas of a given site, and social organization—particularly those 
of the issuing authority, and important terminus post quem43 information. 
In fact, coins are so critical to archaeological research that they are 
among the few key artifacts that have their find spot recorded with three-
dimensional precision.44 
                                                                                                             
 40. RENFREW & BAHN, supra note 25, at 107. 
 41. Archaeological Inst. of Am., Archaeology Watch: Coins and Archaeology, Aug. 
7, 2007, http://www.archaeological.org/webinfo.php?page=10438 [hereinafter Coins and 
Archaeology]. 
 42. Latin for “in place,” the term is used in archaeology to refer to objects that are in 
their original place of deposition. BARBARA ANN KIPFER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF 
ARCHAEOLOGY 255 (2000). 
 43. Latin for “date after which,” the term is used in archaeology to denote the earliest 
possible absolute date for a given strata. See RENFREW & BAHN, supra note 25, at 131. 
 44. Id. at 107–08. 
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The illicit search for coins also damages an archaeological site as a 
whole and causes the destruction of other important artifacts. Looters’ 
digging invariably destroys important stratigraphic45 information, which 
is critical to archaeologists’ understanding of a given site.46 Furthermore, 
in a desire to find valuable coins, plunderers frequently destroy objects 
that they perceive as having less value in the market.47 
Despite arguments to the contrary,48 even when found in isolated 
hoards outside of settlements sites, as are a significant number,49 coins 
have considerable archaeological value. For example, these hoards help 
archaeologists determine which coins were in circulation at a given place 
and period.50 Also, the location of the hoard in relation to other sites is 
archaeologically valuable.51 Moreover, researchers can derive important 
archaeological information from the relationship among coins in a given 
hoard.52 Furthermore, even for numismatists, the richness of the informa-
tion that can be extracted from an ancient coin increases when its context 
is known.53 For example, frequently found coin types, which add little to 
our store of knowledge without provenance, can, when found in context, 
be a crucial piece of evidence in unraveling the economic and social his-
tory of the ancient world.54 As a consequence, even if one is unconcerned 
with archaeological context, a hoard’s integrity comes into question 
when it appears on the market without provenance, and even the infor-
                                                                                                             
 45. Stratigraphy “is the study and validating of stratification—the analysis in the 
vertical, time dimension of a series of layers in the horizontal space dimension (although 
in practice few layers are precisely horizontal).” Id. at 106. 
 46. Id. 
 47. For example, recent reports from Cyprus indicate that looters destroy ancient 
ceramics while attempting to discover gold and silver coins. Anna Hassapi, Tomb Raiders 
Plundering Kouris Valley Antiquities, CYPRUS MAIL, Aug. 19, 2008, http://www.cyprus-
mail.com/news/main.php?id=40932&archive=1. 
 48. Peter K. Tompa & Ann M. Brose, A Modern Challenge to an Age-Old Pursuit: 
Can Cultural Patrimony Claims and Coin Collecting Coexist?, in WHO OWNS THE PAST?: 
CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 205 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., 2005) 
[hereinafter WHO OWNS THE PAST?]. 
 49. Id. Though, Rose points out that a great number of hoards are found within set-
tlement site habitation levels. Rose, supra note 16. 
 50. Rose, supra note 16. 
 51. Nathan T. Elkins, Why Coins Matter: Trafficking in Undocumented and Illegally 
Exported Ancient Coins in the North American Marketplace, SAVING ANTIQUITIES FOR 
EVERYONE, http://www.savingantiquities.org/feature_coins.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2007). 
 52. David Gill, The Intellectual Consequences of Collecting Classical Coins, 
LOOTING MATTERS, Sept. 24, 2007, http://lootingmatters.blogspot.com/2007/09/intellectual- 
consequences-of-collecting.html. 
 53. Elkin, supra note 42. 
 54. Coins and Archaeology, supra note 41. 
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mation that one can glean from the composition of the hoard itself comes 
into question.55 
When looting occurs, all of this information becomes irretrievably lost. 
Therefore, regardless of one’s opinion of the ethics of antiquities collect-
ing, the importance of preserving the archaeological context and coi-
nage’s key place within it cannot be denied.56 
B. Coin Collecting  
Coin collecting has a long and rich history. Both Emperors Caesar 
(100–44 BCE) and Augustus (63 BCE–14 CE) were documented collec-
tors, and passages from Pliny the Elder suggest that there was a wide-
spread interest in coins and a marketplace for their sale during the Ro-
man era.57 Also, the common practice by Greek, Roman, and Medieval 
rulers of reusing designs from earlier coin types suggests that earlier 
coins were held in high esteem during these times.58 In the following 
centuries, coins were collected and studied by the likes of Petrarch, Louis 
XIV, Charles VI,59 Napoleon, and the American Founding Fathers.60 
Over time, coin collecting has become more sophisticated and wide-
spread, which, in turn, has led to an ever increasing market for coins.61 
Both the opening of Eastern Europe after the Cold War and the increa-
singly frequent use of metal detectors62 have expanded the number of 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. 
 56. RENFREW, supra note 24, at 22 (“[Looted objects] do not contribute to our know-
ledge of the past; indeed they are parasitic upon that knowledge, for they themselves can 
only be dated, authenticated and given any kind of interpretation by comparison with 
similar artefacts that have indeed been found within a coherent context.”). 
 57. Elkins, supra note 51. 
 58. Tompa & Brose, supra note 48, at 209. 
 59. The Habsburg Emperor, Charles VI, was such an avid collector that, in order to 
take his collection when he travelled, he had a special case constructed for his coins. He 
also placed coins he considered meaningful in the foundations of important churches he 
founded, such as Karlskirche in Vienna. W. OECHSLIN, Fischer von Erlachs „Entwurf 
einer Historischen Architectur”: die Intergration einer erweiterten Geschichtsauffassung 
die Architektur im Zeichen des erstarkten Kaisertums in Wien, in WIEN UND DER 
EUROPÄISCHE BAROCK. 7 XXV. INTERNATIONALER KONGRESS FUER KUNSTGESCHICHTE. 4-
10. 9. 1983, 77, 80 (E. Lisker ed., 1986) (Austria). 
 60. Tompa & Brose, supra note 48, at 209. 
 61. Elkins, supra note 51. 
 62. Metal detectorists, as they are often known, are hobbyists who utilize metal detec-
tors to hunt for archaeological materials for fun or profit, using metal detectors. The ac-
tivities of metal detectorists are controversial as they lead to the destruction of the arc-
haeological record. For a full discussion, see Heritage Action, Metal Detecting: Calling 
Time on Erosion, http://www.heritageaction.org/?page=heritagealerts_metaldetecting (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2007). 
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coins on the market.63 The Internet, however, is perhaps the innovation 
with the greatest consequences to the trade in ancient coins. The Internet 
has revolutionized the way ancient coinage is bought and sold. First, 
there has been an explosion in the number of coins available for purchase 
in an instant. For example, on September 30, 2007, there were 5534 
items for sale within eBay’s “Coins: Ancient” category, ranging in “buy-
it-now” prices from $5 to $800,000.64 On the same day, a coin-centric 
competitor of eBay, VCoins, advertised that 116 dealers were selling 
72,669 items with an approximate value of $14,400,000.65 Second, the 
Internet has allowed unscrupulous collectors to easily purchase coins in 
an instant from dealers and looters across the world.66 There are even 
instances of online sellers boasting of coins for sale with the dirt still at-
tached.67 There is no way for buyers to vet these sellers, and it is difficult 
to regulate the market as it reaches across international borders. 
The scale of the illicit antiquities market is difficult to quantify, let 
alone the market for ancient coinage, and accounts of its value vary.68 
Even harder to quantify is the number and value of coins exported out of 
Cyprus. Two recent arrests, however, give some indication of the scale of 
some looting operations. In 2002, the Italian Carbinieri discovered and 
arrested a criminal group operating a multimillion-Euro business selling 
illicit coinage over the Internet.69 During a raid, the Carbinieri discovered 
10,000 coins, of which approximately 150 were valuable silver coins 
from Cyprus.70 Subsequent raids uncovered 19,000 more coins as well as 
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CONTEXT (Autumn 2004) http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/projects/iarc/culturewithout 
context/issue15/ficuciello.htm. 
 70. Id. 
502 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:2 
another 650 archaeological objects.71 More recently, in October 2007, 
five men were arrested in connection with an antiquities smuggling ring 
in Cyprus.72 Police found that the men had hundreds of gold and bronze 
coins, as well as other antiquities, in their possession, with a total esti-
mated value of over EUR 280,000.73 
Another piece of anecdotal evidence on the Cypriot trade in coins is a 
2008 interview with a Cypriot metal detectorist in the Cyprus Mail.74 In 
the interview, the metal detectorist, alias “Achilleas,” claims that there is 
a thriving black market on the island and that looters can easily make a 
good living.75 He refers to one acquaintance that uses a tomb he discov-
ered “as a sort of bank” that he “visits whenever he wants cash.”76 Achil-
leas goes so far as to imply that found objects turned over to the govern-
ment are purposefully “mislaid” and then sold on the international black 
market.77 Though unsubstantiated, the account suggests the prevalence of 
sophisticated, educated looters on the island. As this example indicates, 
despite the growing concern of the international community, “the trade in 
undocumented ancient coins continues to grow and remains a serious 
problem for those wishing to preserve valuable information about the 
past and protect our common cultural heritage.”78 
C. Coins and Provenance 
Provenance (or sometimes provenience) can have two meanings de-
pending on one’s perspective. In the art historical terminology, the term 
generally refers to the past ownership of an item. Alternatively, archaeo-
logists use the term provenance to refer to the precise location of an ob-
ject during excavation, and it serves as one of the key factors in deter-
mining the context of any given archaeological object.79 Because looting 
destroys the archaeological provenance of a coin, it is the latter use of the 
term that this Note will favor. 
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2009] ILLEGAL TENDER 503 
The vast majority of coins, both in collections and on the market, lack 
provenance information (both for prior ownership and location) and 
when any indication of a coin’s origin is given, it is often only for a city 
or region.80 It is this widespread lack of provenance for coinage that is 
the central problem facing those who seek to prevent a market in looted 
coins and antiquities. If a coin lacks provenance, many, if not most, col-
lectors and dealers will assume that it is licit, i.e., not looted. This allows 
collectors to turn a blind eye to the problems of looting.81 Therefore, it is 
instructive to analyze why coins in particular have little or no provenance 
information. 
Coinage seems to lack good provenance because of three factors. First, 
unlike modern currency, ancient coins moved more freely across sove-
reign borders in antiquity because their value was tied to the metal’s in-
trinsic value. This led to a far wider geographic dispersal of coins in 
comparison to contemporary money, which is generally limited to specif-
ic countries or economic zones.82 Therefore, a Cypriot coin might be 
found in Egypt, England, or Rome. Second, coins have been collected for 
centuries, indeed, since antiquity, and some coins have traded hands in-
numerable times.83 This has resulted in the loss of provenance. Third, the 
very nature of coinage as a standardized means of exchange requires that 
sovereigns repeatedly reproduce near exact copies. This means that for 
many coins there are several duplicates, which can make attributing a 
coin to a particular find spot exceedingly difficult.84 As an advocate for a 
free market in ancient coins has noted, “The very nature of this trade—
added to the original wide dispersion of the coins themselves—makes 
determining the provenance of any particular coin virtually impossi-
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ble.”85 Without provenance information, a dealer or collector cannot en-
sure whether a coin is licit or not and, if the law assumes such coin is not 
licit, many coins will become untouchable. 
II. EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
A. The 1970 UNESCO Convention 
The most important international instrument addressing the antiquities 
trade is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organi-
zation’s (“UNESCO”) Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Pre-
venting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property (“1970 UNESCO Convention”).86 The Convention’s stated mis-
sion is as follows: 
1. The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit 
import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property is 
one of the main causes of the impoverishment of the cultural her-
itage of the countries of origin of such property and that interna-
tional co-operation constitutes one of the most efficient means of 
protecting each country’s cultural property against all the dan-
gers resulting therefrom. 
2. To this end, the States Parties undertake to oppose such prac-
tices with the means at their disposal, and particularly by remov-
ing their causes, putting a stop to current practices, and by help-
ing to make the necessary reparations.87 
One of the Convention’s important features is that it provides a customa-
ry legal definition of “cultural property.” Thus, among the items that Ar-
ticle 1 identifies as cultural property are “products of archaeological ex-
cavations (including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological disco-
veries”88 and “antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as in-
scriptions, coins and engraved seals.”89 It also establishes that any item 
that is imported, exported, or traded in contravention of the laws of a 
                                                                                                             
 85. Tompa & Brose, supra note 48, at 209. 
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State Party in accordance with the articles of the convention will be con-
sidered illicit.90 
Another significant aspect of the Convention is Article 9: 
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is 
in jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological mate-
rials may call upon other States Parties who are affected. The 
States Parties to this Convention undertake, in these circums-
tances, to participate in a concerted international effort to deter-
mine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including 
the control of exports and imports and international commerce in 
the specific materials concerned. Pending agreement each State 
concerned shall take provisional measures to the extent feasible 
to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the re-
questing State.91 
This establishes a system through which States Parties can enter into bi-
lateral agreements to protect a State’s threatened cultural property. It is 
on this Article that the United States bases its implementing legislation. 
Though the treaty entered into force in 1972, the effect of the 
UNESCO Convention was limited because no market countries (with the 
notable exception of the United States) ratified the Convention until re-
cently.92 In fact, the United States was the only market nation to partici-
pate in the Convention’s drafting and the first to ratify it.93 However, as 
issues of cultural property have gained prominence and public opinion 
has shifted towards favoring protection, important source nations like 
France, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have joined the 
Convention.94 Also, the treaty’s 1970 effective date has served as a wide-
ly recognized bright-line cut-off date for many museum collection poli-
cies.95 Still, commentators have continued to critique the Convention for 
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favoring source nations’ retentionist goals.96 Despite these critiques, 
there is no denying the Convention’s significance as a catalyst for chang-
ing attitudes towards the antiquities trade and a increasing the general 
recognition that the protection of antiquities is critically importance.97 
B. The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 
Though an original party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the United 
States did not implement the treaty domestically until 1983. The enacting 
legislation, the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 
(“CPIA”),98 specifically implemented Articles 7(b)99 and 9 of the 1970 
Convention. In essence, however, the CPIA reduces the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention to an “agreement to agree.”100 The CPIA grants the president 
the power to enter into bilateral agreements—MOUs—at the request of 
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States Parties to the Convention, so long as certain criteria are satis-
fied.101 The president must determine 
(A) that the cultural patrimony of the State Party is in jeopardy from the 
pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials of the State Party; 
(B) that the State Party has taken measures consistent with the Conven-
tion to protect its cultural patrimony; 
(C) that— 
(i) the application of the import restrictions set forth in section 
2606 of this title with respect to archaeological or ethnological  
material of the State Party, if applied in concert with similar re-
strictions implemented, or to be implemented within a reasonable 
period of time, by those nations (whether or not State Parties) indi-
vidually having a significant import trade in such material, would 
be of substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage, 
and 
(ii) remedies less drastic than the application of the restrictions set 
forth in such section are not available; and 
(D) that the application of the import restrictions set forth in section 
2606 of this title in the particular circumstances is consistent with the 
general interest of the international community in the interchange of 
cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural, and educational 
purposes.102 
After an MOU enters into force, the parties must create “a list of arc-
haeological or ethnological material of the State Party covered by the 
agreement . . . .”103 Known as a “Designated List,”104 it must be “suffi-
ciently specific and precise to insure that (1) the import restrictions . . . 
are applied only to the archeological and ethnological material covered 
by the agreement . . . and (2) fair notice is given to importers and other 
persons as to what material is subject to such restrictions.”105 
Once an item is listed it may not be imported into the United States 
without certification or other documentation from the State Party that the 
object was legally exported or proof that it was exported from the State 
Party prior to the date such material was designated under Section 
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2604.106 If an item is imported in violation of Section 2606, it is subject 
to seizure and forfeiture.107 If an object is forfeited, the United States will 
first offer it to the source country.108 If the object is not returned to the 
source country, the United States will return the object to the claimant so 
long as the claimant establishes that he or she is the bona fide purchaser 
of the item with valid title.109 Significantly, the CPIA only allows for 
civil enforcement, including the forfeiture of the cultural item in ques-
tion.110 
The maximum period an MOU can be in effect is five years.111 They 
are, however, renewable for additional five-year periods if the govern-
ment determines that the factors that justified entering into the initial 
agreement are still in effect.112 The CPIA also allows the president to 
implement emergency import restrictions when certain conditions are 
satisfied.113 These are also limited to a five-year maximum and are only 
renewable for a further three-year period if the president determines that 
the emergency conditions still exist.114 
To aid in its execution, the CPIA created an advisory committee to 
evaluate requests from States Parties.115 Known as the Cultural Property 
Advisory Committee (“CPAC”), this body is composed of eleven mem-
bers: two representing museum interests; three experts in archaeology, 
anthropology, ethnology, or related areas; three experts in the interna-
tional sale of archaeological, ethnological, and other cultural property; 
and three representing the general public.116 During the evaluation pro-
cess, the CPAC invites public comment on MOU requests, but the original 
petitions for import restrictions and the recommendations that the CPAC 
make to the State Department are all classified.117 This practice has led 
many to criticize the CPAC’s decision-making process as too secre-
tive.118 There are also allegations that the State Department has filled the 
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CPAC with members who are sympathetic to the archaeologists’ point of 
view—to the detriment of dealers and collectors.119 
The United States’ first action regarding Cyprus under the CPIA was 
the imposition of an emergency import restriction on Byzantine eccle-
siastical and ritual ethnological material on April 12, 1999. This made 
Cyprus the first State that the United States protected under the CPIA in 
the Eastern Hemisphere.120 But it was not until July 19, 2002, that the 
United States and Cyprus executed an MOU regarding import restric-
tions on pre-classical and classical archaeological material.121 This MOU 
applied to certain designated classes of archaeological material dating 
from approximately the eighth millennium BCE to 330 CE. The desig-
nated archaeological material list included ceramic vessels, sculpture, 
inscriptions, stone vessels, architectural elements, seals, amulets, stelae, 
mosaics, metal vessels, stands sculpture, and personal objects.122 Then, on 
August 17, 2006, the U.S. and Cypriot governments amended the MOU 
to include the Byzantine ecclesiastical and ritual ethnological material 
that were protected in the 1999 emergency import restriction, effectively 
extending the protection of this type of material until July 16, 2007.123 
The most recent MOU between the United States and Cyprus, effective 
July 16, 2007, extended the agreement for a further five years. The only 
amendment to the MOU was the addition of “[c]oins of Cypriot-types 
made of gold, silver, and bronze” to the archaeological material.124 The 
new restriction includes a non-exhaustive list of common types of Cy-
priot coins that date from the sixth century BCE to 235 CE to illustrate 
the type of coins protected.125 These coins include currency from ancient 
Cypriot and Hellenistic kingdoms, as well as from the Roman Empire.126 
Cyprus also has obligations under the MOU. Under the agreement, the 
Cypriot government “will expand its efforts to discourage pillage of cul-
tural resources, and the unauthorized export of such material” through a 
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number of initiatives intended to satisfy Section 2602(a)(1).127 The MOU 
further specifies that the Cypriot government will seek to expand the ex-
change of archaeological material where there is no threat to its cultural 
heritage, such as temporary and long-term loans.128 The agreement also 
requires the United States to use its “best efforts” to expand exchanges 
between the two countries that promote greater understanding and pre-
servation of Cypriot cultural heritage.129 Finally, the MOU contains the 
caveat that the obligations and activities the governments are responsible 
for under the MOU are “subject to the laws and regulations of each Gov-
ernment, as applicable, including the availability of funds.”130 There is no 
regulation of antiquities once they have entered into the United States. 
C. Cypriot Antiquities Legislation 
A brief survey of Cypriot antiquities laws related to the issue of looted 
coinage is also necessary because, as previously noted, the CPIA requires 
that in order for the United States to conclude an MOU with a requesting 
State it must take internal measures to protect its cultural property.131 
Furthermore, Cypriot antiquities laws are relevant because of their influ-
ence on the country’s looting problem. 
As is common in many source countries, the Cypriot Antiquities Law 
vests ownership of all undiscovered antiquities as of the date the legisla-
tion entered into force in the State.132 Under the Law, if an individual 
accidentally finds an antiquity and does not possess an excavation li-
cense, he or she must report the find to the local authorities.133 If the an-
tiquity is movable, the individual must bring the object with him or her to 
the local authorities and identify where the antiquity was found.134 Pro-
vided that the find was not the result of illegal excavation, the Minister of 
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Communications and Works has the discretion to grant the finder a li-
cense to own the antiquity.135 If the object is movable and the Minister 
decides that a national collection should acquire the antiquity, the gov-
ernment will pay the finder a gratuity that it deems appropriate under the 
circumstances.136 Violators of this provision face criminal penalties and 
confiscation of the antiquity.137 
To address the problem of looting, the Cypriot government has also 
enacted legislation that makes it a criminal offense to possess or use metal 
detectors at or near archaeological sites and ancient monuments or to use 
them to find or detect antiquities.138 The legislation further requires that 
antiquities dealers apply for a dealer’s license from the Director of An-
tiquities.139 The law also states that parties can only purchase antiquities 
from the Cyprus Museum, licensed antiquities dealers, or legal posses-
sors of the objects.140 Again, violations of these provisions carry criminal 
penalties.141 
Finally, no individual can export antiquities out of Cyprus without first 
gaining an export license from a committee consisting of the Director, 
the Curator of Archaeological Museums and Surveys, and the Curator of 
Monuments.142 Licenses can only be granted for antiquities exported for 
the purpose of temporary exhibition, long-term loan to a cultural institu-
tion, or the scientific study of excavation material.143 Importantly, a li-
cense cannot be granted for the export of an antiquity into a private col-
lection.144 Violators of this export scheme face the same penalties as 
those who engage in illegal excavations.145 
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III. ANTIQUITIES LAWS IN ACTION 
A. General Effectiveness of Antiquities Laws 
In light of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the CPIA, the question 
remains: will these regimes effectively help prevent the looting of arc-
haeological sites? The most obvious result of the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention and its legislative progeny is the increasing public awareness of 
the problem of looting and the public’s changing attitudes towards antiq-
uities issues.146 In fact, this may be the only meaningful result of the leg-
islation regarding coin-related looting. As noted above, the CPIA, which 
implements the 1970 UNESCO Convention, only provides for civil en-
forcement. Therefore, without criminal enforcement, source nations gen-
erally must commence civil litigation in order to vindicate their rights.147 
Though there have been some high profile restitutions to source coun-
tries in recent years,148 for the most part, claims for antiquities have been 
for important, museum-quality works. There are several reasons why 
source countries have only brought claims for major works, but the most 
significant reason is the cost.149 Of these, the greatest expense is the price 
of an attorney licensed in the United States. Added to this are the costs of 
proving complex evidentiary issues, such as proving the antiquity’s 
country of origin, as well as issues regarding the statute of limitations 
and whether or not the antiquity was on the market prior to the entry into 
force of the relevant legislation. Though restitution of a major work or 
collection of works is often worth this outlay,150 will it be so for coins, 
which are rarely valued at more than ten thousand dollars? Most likely 
not. Furthermore, the CPIA restrictions are rarely, if ever, relied upon for 
making restitution claims. Instead, these litigations tend to rely upon the 
                                                                                                             
 146. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 147. MACKENZIE, supra note 34, at 117. 
 148. For example, in the shadow of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, J. Paul Getty Museum, Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, and Princeton 
University Art Museum have all recently agreed to return antiquities to Italy. Elisabetta 
Povoledo, Progress Seen in Talks on Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007. 
 149. O’KEEFE, supra note 97, at 120. 
 150. For example three countries, Croatia, Hungary, and, Lebanon, all claimed the 
Sevso Treasure, a collection of late Roman silver valued at $187 million. Alan Riding, 14 
Roman Treasures, on View and Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006. For more on the 
Sevso Treasure, see RENFREW, supra note 24, at 46–51. 
2009] ILLEGAL TENDER 513 
National Stolen Property Act151 and basic violations like falsification of 
customs forms.152 
Even if successful, it is not clear that these restitution claims and ex-
port/import restrictions have any effect on the initial looting of archaeo-
logical sites, which should be the primary goal of any regulation on an-
tiquities. As Mackenzie notes: 
Returns to source countries will ameliorate the destruction of context 
caused by looting only if they discourage prospective purchasers from 
buying illicit antiquities, thereby providing a disincentive to looters be-
fore the objects are taken from the ground. . . . [D]ata suggest[s] that 
currently market buyers feel no such deterrence.153 
Indeed, some argue that rather than protecting archaeological sites, ex-
port and import restrictions make matters worse. Merryman summarizes 
this position: 
[E]xport controls are difficult and expensive to enforce and in many na-
tions are easily evaded. By denying the opportunity for licit export such 
laws drive the trade underground, assuring the existence of an active, 
profitable and corrupting black market. In practice, there is a lively trade 
in objects smuggled out of the territories of source nations whose laws 
prohibit export. . . . Such laws assure undocumented decontextualiza-
tion, resulting in irretrievable loss of information and the proliferation 
of orphaned objects about whose precise source and context nothing is 
known. . . . [I]f one set out to harm the cultural heritage of all mankind 
it would be difficult to devise a more effective way of doing so.154 
This is particularly true when looters, dealers, and collectors see the im-
port and export controls as unfair and unduly restrictive, and therefore, 
not worthy of adherence. There is evidence to suggest that many looters 
realize that their activities are illegal, but do not think that they are mo-
rally wrong, believing that it is their right to exploit their own cultural 
heritage.155 As for chance finders, unless there are greater incentives to 
do so, it is unlikely that they will report their discoveries to the proper 
authorities.156 
                                                                                                             
 151. National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) (providing for criminal 
penalties for those who possess stolen property). 
 152. See William G. Pearlstein, Cultural Property, Congress, the Courts, and Customs, 
in WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 48, at 9. 
 153. MACKENZIE, supra note 34, at 118. 
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Fee Simple Box, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1015, 1018 (2007). 
514 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:2 
Dealers and collectors also find export and import restrictions dispro-
portionately restrictive. In interviews, Mackenzie found that 
[a]ntiquities dealers see blanket export restrictions by source countries 
as so grossly unfair to the free trade goals of the market that not only do 
they show a lack of respect for these laws in discourse, they go so far as 
hold these restrictive pieces of legislation responsible for the outflow of 
material. . . . Far from trying to abide by the export restrictions of 
source nations in practice . . . and endeavouring to avoid the purchase 
of an illegally exported antiquity, the dealers . . . saw these export re-
strictions as so unfair that they deserved to be ignored . . . .157 
From these findings, it can be extrapolated that similar attitudes exist 
regarding U.S. import restrictions. At the very least, the existence of im-
port and export restrictions is not a successful deterrent to the looting of 
archaeological sites and, at worst, may help foster a thriving black mar-
ket that feeds on looted antiquities.158 
B. The Effect of Antiquities Laws on the Protection of Cypriot Coinage 
The CPIA regime, however, remains ineffective159 and restrictions on 
Cypriot coinage will be no exception. Coin collecting has a long-
standing tradition, and there are hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of 
ancient coins in circulation.160 Of these, very few have provenance in-
formation and, for those that do, this information is often incomplete. 
                                                                                                             
 157. MACKENZIE, supra note 34, at 86 (emphasis omitted). 
 158. For example, Kremer and Wilkening, two Harvard economists, found that in 
poorer countries (which most source nations are) export restrictions “may lead to inade-
quate maintenance, black markets, and the permanent loss of art . . . .” Michael Kremer & 
Tom Wilkening, Antiquities: Long-Term Leases as an Alternative to Export Restrictions 
3 (Sept. 11, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.economics.harvard. 
edu/faculty/kremer/files/Antiquities%2011Sept2007cToSend.pdf). The illegal market in 
antiquities not only harms the archaeological sites, it also has effects on the market. The 
Milken Institute found that 
[i]n economic terms, the antiquities trade represents a classic case of market 
failure: illegally looted archaeological assets are un-priced, existing outside es-
tablished markets. Distribution may occur under unlawful, inefficient, and often 
destructive circumstances, inflating prices and creating increased incentives to 
manipulate the market. The result is a distorted economic value and prolifera-
tion of an informal trade that inhibits the growth of a healthy legal market able 
to support proper discovery, development, and conservation initiatives. 
Milken Inst., supra note 68, at 2. 
 159. Even former members of the CPAC criticize the CPIA regime. Kahn, supra note 
38. 
 160. Tompa & Brose, supra note 48, at 205. 
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This creates a situation whereby collectors and dealers will readily be 
able to rationalize that a lack of provenance does not make any given 
coin illicitly excavated. Furthermore, collectors and dealers have vehe-
mently criticized the recent import restriction on Cypriot coins. Looters 
will also find it simple to import illicit coins into the United States be-
cause of their small size and the ability to market and trade coins via the 
Internet.161 
Repatriation claims, once coins have entered the United States, will al-
so prove to be a poor means of deterring looting. For instance, because of 
the relatively small value of any given coin, it is doubtful that Cyprus 
will pursue a repatriation claim.162 Even if a repatriation claim is success-
fully pursued, it is unlikely that this will have an effect on looters be-
cause the claim will only punish the collector. To be sure, this will re-
move the incentive for some to collect, but only for U.S. collectors and 
only those who fear prosecution. In fact, in most cases the only effect a 
repatriation claim will have on a collector or dealer who does not actual-
ly smuggle the item will be the loss of the coin in question. Without 
criminal penalties attached to the possession of these items through the 
CPIA, the import restrictions appear to have little teeth.163 Even if the 
restriction serves to reduce the market for Cypriot coins in the United 
States, without the participation of other source countries, the looters and 
middleman can simply sell their ill-gotten objects elsewhere. 
As a result, until there are greater international restrictions on the an-
tiquities market, local law is the only way to truly deter Cypriot looters. 
However, the fact that Cyprus’ archaeological record “continues to be in 
jeopardy from pillage,”164 despite having strongly worded antiquities 
laws since 1967, suggests that looters have little to fear at home. One 
factor undermining Cypriot antiquities protection is its perceived unfair-
ness. Because it is somewhat draconian, market actors feel that it is ille-
gitimate. For example, in a recent interview, a Cypriot metal detectorist 
referred to Cypriot antiquities legislation illegalizing unlicensed excava-
                                                                                                             
 161. The difficulty in identifying “Cypriot-type” coins may be another barrier to the 
effective enforcement of the import restriction. See, e.g., Wayne G. Sales, Will the Real 
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claim regarding a large coin hoard, but hoards are rare and may have little archaeological 
value. 
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tions as “sheer nonsense.”165 The metal detectorist went on to assert that 
he began to sell the antiquities he finds on the black market only after he 
discovered the administration of the Cypriot antiquities scheme to be 
corrupt.166 Whether or not this allegation is true, that it is believed and 
publicized only serves to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the legislation. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The above-noted failings of the current legislative scheme for antiqui-
ties protection suggest that alternative solutions are necessary. In fact, 
writers familiar with the problems antiquities looting presents have rec-
ognized that the current legislative regime, with its focus on import and 
export restrictions, is ineffective.167 They have proposed several alterna-
tive regimes and each, if adopted, has the potential to help curb the loot-
ing of antiquities. However, none of these proposals alone will serve as a 
magic bullet. A more nuanced approach, which adopts aspects of each of 
these proposals, is therefore advisable. By analyzing the positive and 
negative points of some of these schemes, a comprehensive alternative 
regime can be devised that may have some effect on antiquities looting. 
What follows is not meant as an exhaustive survey of alternatives, but 
rather an introduction to a few proposals that may, together, form parts of 
a solution. 
A. Free Antiquities Market  
One prominent theory, championed by Merryman and Bator, is the li-
beralization of the antiquities market. This entails the relaxation of exist-
ing export and import restrictions so that they only apply to objects clas-
sified as national treasures or currently used for religious or ceremonial 
purposes.168 
Many of the justifications for the free market approach unsurprisingly 
focus on monetary factors. Among the arguments for the free interna-
tional movement of antiquities is that by assigning antiquities a value, 
they will be more likely to receive the best care possible.169 Furthermore, 
this market would allow the individual or institution that most “values” 
                                                                                                             
 165. Mackay, supra note 74. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See, e.g., MACKENZIE, supra note 34; Bator, supra note 32; Merryman, supra note 
29. 
 168. See Merryman, supra note 29. 
 169. John H. Merryman, The Free International Movement of Cultural Property, 31 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 9 (1998). 
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the object—defined through purchase price—to possess it.170 This, it is 
argued, is a virtue because it allows for the party most likely to have the 
desire and resources for the care of the object to possess it.171 
The free market proponents also argue that their model helps to pre-
vent looting. The sale of available antiquities and the addition of applica-
ble export duties offer source nations an opportunity to generate income 
off their cultural objects.172 This income can then be used in efforts to 
prevent looters and generally promote antiquities protection.173 Suppor-
ters of the free market alternative also suggest that the steady increase in 
the supply of licit, authentic archaeological objects with firm provenance 
would appeal to museums, collectors, and dealers, reducing the demand 
for black market objects.174 The desirability of legitimate antiquities 
would also mean that they could be sold at a premium over black market 
antiquities, creating an incentive for suppliers to sell legitimately.175 
An open market system also recognizes that the free movement of an-
tiquities, if properly administered, is beneficial for worldwide cultural 
exchange.176 Antiquities are a universal link to the past and, once their 
archaeological context is properly documented, the objects’ cultural val-
ue is not diminished if they are housed in another country. The 1970 
                                                                                                             
 170. Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 23, at 849. 
 171. Id. Merryman uses the example of Peru, where archaeological objects are retained 
through restrictive export restrictions even though the materials are not adequately con-
served or displayed. If these objects were allowed, through a free international market, to 
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 172. Merryman, supra note 29, at 29. Merryman has also suggested that through man-
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 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 35–36. 
 175. Kremer & Wilkening, supra note 158, at 1. Collectors and museums pay a pre-
mium for objects with known provenance for the same reason that any object with good 
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3. if returned, the object would again be put to those uses.” Merryman, supra note 29, at 
18. 
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UNESCO Convention drafters recognized this when they wrote that “the 
interchange of cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural and 
educational purposes increases the knowledge of the civilization of Man, 
enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect and 
appreciation among nations.”177 The benefits of an open antiquities trade 
for market nations are readily apparent: easy access to archaeological 
objects for both their cultural institutions and citizens. Less obvious, but 
equally important, is the advantage an open trade offers to source coun-
tries. As Bator noted, “Art is a good ambassador.”178 Through exposure 
to art from various countries, viewers may become more interested in the 
countries of origin. By creating a taste for its art through export, a source 
country can encourage foreign tourists, scholars, and students to visit and 
study its culture.179 
B. Antiquities Leasing and Option Contracts 
A prominent reason that source countries have not endorsed a free 
market in antiquities is the fear that certain objects of superlative cultural 
importance may be removed from their country of origin—no State 
wants a repeat of the Elgin Marbles.180 There is also the threat that cor-
rupt officials might deplete a country’s archaeological heritage for finan-
cial gain if an open market exists.181 In response to these concerns, some 
academics have suggested using long-term leasing or option contracts.182 
This would allow private collectors and museums to lease antiquities for 
long periods or purchase the items while the source nations maintain an 
option to repurchase after a set time.183 This system may offer a com-
promise between source countries and collectors because it will, as sug-
gested by Kremer and Wilkening, “preserve local ownership and avoid 
alienation of the object while reducing looting, helping to preserve arti-
facts, and allowing international access.”184 
Kremer and Wilkening further argue that 
                                                                                                             
 177. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, pmbl. 
 178. Bator, supra note 32, at 306. 
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allowing lease markets could raise revenue for artifact-rich countries 
and create incentives for maintenance and preservation, while maintain-
ing long-term ownership rights for the country of origin. By putting the 
object in the hands of the highest value consumer at each point of time, 
leases would generate incentives for protection of objects and funds 
that could be used for the legal excavation of at-risk sites or other 
needs. Since future ownership rights are preserved, a country could 
manage its cultural heritage without restricting objects from flowing to 
highest value use.185 
Using economic models, Kremer and Wilkening conclude that leasing 
and option contracts are better protections for many of the rationales that 
are raised for export and import restrictions.186 They also suggest that 
giving limited leasing rights to chance finders of artifacts may encourage 
these finders to report the objects to the appropriate authorities rather 
than selling them on the black market,187 a view shared by Wendel.188 
Wendel favors rewarding finders who come forward to the proper au-
thorities with an ownership for a term of years while the source country 
maintains a future interest.189 He reasons that, if given temporary posses-
sion, a finder will be more likely to come forward rather than going to 
the black market.190 Wendel also suggests that incentivizing chance find-
ers who leave objects in situ by awarding them an increased term of 
years can potentially result in a greater number of proper excavations.191 
Leasing and options contracts, however, may not be the final solution. 
Many items, such as the average Cypriot coin, are not valuable enough to 
warrant making such elaborate arrangements. Instead, leasing and option 
contracts are more appropriate for rarer and more valuable antiquities. 
Also, even if a leasing scheme helps limit the black market,192 it will none-
theless be necessary to increase antiquities-related policing—perhaps with 
funds generated through leasing193—in order to curb organized looting. 
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C. Partage 
Recently, an old system of distributing archaeological finds is gaining 
some ground among commentators. Known as partage, the system entails 
the sharing of archaeological finds between the source country and an 
archaeologist’s affiliated museum or university.194 This system was 
widely practiced during the twentieth century and was instrumental in the 
formation of some of the finest archaeological collections in Western 
museums and universities.195 Though currently only used to a limited 
extent,196 commentators, such as Cuno and Renfrew, favor a return to the 
practice as a means of allowing market countries to continue to collect 
newly excavated antiquities.197 As they note, the advantage of partage is 
that it allows for the legitimate dispersal of antiquities after careful exca-
vation. Furthermore, it incentivizes museums and universities to give 
greater financial and expert support to these excavations, particularly in 
the countries that require it the most. Part of this funding can help differ 
the costs of policing the sites and combating antiquities looting. One 
problem with this regime, however, is that it may not take into account 
private collectors. This is a concern if the goal is the creation of a legiti-
mate licit antiquities market. Still, this issue could be addressed if a pri-
vate partage system is adopted in which collectors can contribute finan-
cial funds to a dig in return for a small portion of the finds.198 
D. Antiquities Registration 
Regardless of what type of cultural heritage regime a country favors, 
without obtaining the proper provenance information for newly discov-
ered antiquities these alternatives can be easily manipulated and trans-
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gressed. The ultimate objective of any legislation (or lack thereof) must 
be the protection of archaeological context, but the lack of transparency 
regarding provenance in the present system is directly at odds with this 
goal. Without standardized provenance information, participants in the 
antiquities trade (i.e., dealers and collectors) can easily rationalize that 
any piece that lacks provenance is a licit, good faith, chance find.199 Fur-
thermore, the lack of any systematic notation of provenance greatly 
hinders any attempt at enforcing anti-looting laws and, because of evi-
dentiary difficulties, makes repatriation claims more difficult.200 In order 
to combat this problem, Mackenzie has proposed instituting a mandatory 
public registration scheme for antiquities.201 Several parties, including 
UNESCO, have suggested registration for buyers and sellers of antiqui-
ties, administered through dealers.202 This type of scheme, however, does 
not cover transactions that do not go through a dealer, and would there-
fore fail to prevent the entry of illicit antiquities into the market.203 
Instead, a more comprehensive scheme is necessary. As Mackenzie 
envisions it, public registration 
would enable the tracing of antiquities through their stages of private 
and public ownership; would be useful for the purposes of insurance; 
would discourage the purchase from sellers within those countries of 
antiquities not listed, on the inference that they were looted; and would 
enable museums and historians to track down items they might care to 
inspect or borrow for the purposes of scholarship or display.204 
In order for a registration system to work, one necessary sacrifice would 
be a type of amnesty, whereby all known antiquities within the system’s 
jurisdiction would be registered and receive clean title, effectively wip-
ing out any repatriation claims on items already out of the ground. As 
Mackenzie notes, however, if the goal is to prevent further looting, be-
cause these items’ archaeological context is already lost, the focus should 
be on items still in the ground—not on repatriation claims.205 If the regis-
tration scheme is only enacted in limited jurisdictions, it will also be ne-
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cessary to require that all archaeological items that subsequently enter 
the jurisdiction be accompanied by well-documented provenance in order 
to be registered.206 In conjunction with his registration plan, Mackenzie 
advocates for more effective criminal penalties, modeled after those used 
for white collar crimes.207 He suggests that the registration system, 
coupled with the threat of severe, yet appropriate, criminal penalties, 
would stem the trade in looted antiquities by making it more difficult for 
dealers to hide behind the “unknown” factor, and more dangerous for 
them to deal in illicit items.208 
One flaw in Mackenzie’s suggested system is that he does not account 
for the methods by which licit antiquities will continue to be available. If 
source countries continue to focus on retention and repatriation, there 
will be fewer new antiquities for the market. This could promote disho-
nesty in dealers and collectors, particularly if they are able to persist in 
rationalizing their behavior by relying on the belief that the source coun-
try’s laws are unduly restrictive. Consequently, it is probably necessary 
to create a scheme that embraces both the mass registration of antiquities 
and a system similar to the leasing regime or open market approach. 
Mass registration would also be costly, but technologies like comput-
ers and the Internet make registration more economically viable than ev-
er before. More problematic are the costs necessary to police the sites 
and train archaeologists to properly locate and document the finds. These 
costs could perhaps be offset through the leasing and sale of antiquities, 
coupled with fees for granting export licenses and foreign aid. 
V. POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS? 
Having outlined some of the possible alternative regimes for the protec-
tion of antiquities, one must ask: why have countries persisted in using 
import/export restrictions to attempt to prevent antiquities looting? Cost 
is undoubtedly one factor. In particular, increased policing of archaeo-
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logical sites and an administration registration system would be signifi-
cantly more costly than the measures currently employed. Another im-
portant factor, however, appears to be political. 
As Cuno has noted, “Antiquities . . . have a political meaning. They 
give modern nations a claim on an ancient past and legitimize politically 
dominant cultures as national cultures.”209 He argues that 
[national cultures] are defined by and are meant to sustain the powerful 
elite within a nation, and they are defined by others as a way of distin-
guishing one national culture from another: ours from theirs. Antiqui-
ties play a role in this, either because the people of a modern nation feel 
a direct, racial link to those earlier peoples, or because more frequently 
a modern nation derives a particular (modern) benefit from them. That 
benefit may be financial, in terms of tourism, or political: important 
archaeological remains give a modern nation a place of prominence at 
international forums (such as UNESCO) that it might not otherwise 
have for is lack of political, economic, military, or strategic importance 
in the world’s affairs.210 
In light of this, commentators have noted the tendency of source na-
tions to restrict the export of archaeological objects aggressively as the 
protection of patrimony increasingly becomes an important political 
tool.211 Meanwhile, the United States has exacerbated this tendency by 
acquiescing to source country demands because it is politically expe-
dient.212 As a result, politicians make decisions regarding antiquities pro-
tection with an eye towards domestic and foreign relations rather than 
towards the best means of preserving our fragile archaeological record.213 
A. Cypriot Political Motivation 
Though other countries are better known for using antiquities as politi-
cal tools,214 Cyprus is not immune to the practice. In particular, Cypriot 
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officials often employ the issue of looting as a means to focus attention 
on the occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey in 1974.215 This occupa-
tion was explicitly referenced by the Cypriot Ambassador to the United 
States, Andreas Kakouris, in his remarks at the MOU signing ceremony 
on July 19, 2007.216 In fact, in most official remarks regarding looting, 
Cypriot sources almost exclusively refer to the problem as either only 
occurring in the Turkish-controlled portion of the island, or after 1974 
(the date of the Turkish invasion).217 During this ceremony, Ambassador 
Kakouris reiterated the mantra he used when speaking to pro-coin col-
lecting individuals when he said: “[i]t may be your hobby, but it’s our 
heritage!”218 
When government officials fail to recognize that antiquities are the 
common heritage of the world and they use these objects as a nationalis-
tic, political tool, it is not so much the protection of archaeological ob-
jects and context that are the focus of legislative regimes, but instead the 
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symbolic retention of the objects in the source country.219 However, as 
Merryman has noted, “[T]he belief that cultural objects belong within the 
national territory and the rhetoric that supports that belief are themselves 
cultural relics; they are lingering expressions of the romantic nationalism 
that blossomed in the first half of the nineteenth century.”220 
B. U.S. Political Motivations 
Though certainly motivated by a desire to protect archaeological ma-
terial, the United States also uses MOUs to gain political capital. To be 
sure, the United States has long supported antiquities protection.221 It was 
also one of the first countries to enact the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
Additionally, a recent Harris Poll found that ninety-six percent of Ameri-
cans favored laws protecting archaeological sites.222 The United States, 
however, continues to utilize the CPIA regime despite the questionable 
success of the legislation and the presence of several alternatives that 
potentially offer more effective approaches to the protection of antiqui-
ties. Furthermore, as noted above, most attempts at enforcement and re-
patriation utilize the National Stolen Property Act, making the CPIA “a 
sideshow” rather than the legal focal point of U.S. antiquities law.223 
Why, then, does the United States continue to use the CPIA as the only 
regime for the protection of antiquities? 
The answer may be that politics rather than the best interests of the an-
tiquities are driving U.S. policy. To begin with, though partly motivated 
by a desire to protect archaeological objects and sites, the United States 
also based its involvement in the drafting of the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion on political considerations.224 Specifically, as developing nations 
became more integral participants in international organizations in the 
late 1960s, the United States saw the Convention as a means of fostering 
better relations with these States.225 
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Even the United States’ present participation in UNESCO is dictated 
by foreign policy. In 1984, the United States, feeling that the organiza-
tion’s policies were adverse to Western interests, formally withdrew 
from UNESCO.226 It was not until 2003, under the shadow of the second 
Iraq War, that the United States rejoined the organization.227 Statements 
from various U.S. government officials at the time demonstrated the 
clear foreign policy rationale for the United States’ return.228 The United 
States has followed the same logic expressed by Cuno, who argues, “Par-
ticipation in the working of UNESCO is determined by national political 
self-interest. If a country believes it is to the benefit of its political posi-
tion in the world to participate in UNESCO, it will. If it believes it is not, 
it won’t.”229 
The MOU process itself is also fraught with political considerations. 
Because it is housed within the State Department, CPAC’s recommenda-
tions regarding MOU requests are considered with U.S. foreign policy 
objectives in mind.230 One former CPAC member has noted that the 
Committee’s Executive Director, Maria Kouroupas, must ensure that the 
group’s decisions “reflect the wishes of her State Department superiors. 
And those wishes are clear: [c]ultural objects exist to make international 
friends and create better diplomatic relations.”231 That this is the case is 
further suggested by the fact that the State Department keeps classified 
most of the material the CPAC uses in its deliberations, including the 
original MOU request, as well as the final recommendation the Commit-
tee makes to the Department.232 If the only consideration was whether 
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import restrictions would assist in the protection of antiquities, why the 
need for secrecy?233 
Recently, a group of coin collecting organizations filed a complaint 
against the U.S. State Department asking for declaratory and injunctive 
relief under the Freedom of Information Act.234 Through the suit, the 
plaintiffs seek to compel the government to shed light on the decision- 
making process of the CPAC and the State Department.235 Some com-
mentators see this lawsuit as a means to investigate the motivation for 
U.S. willingness to side with source nations, as many in the art world 
“suspect that the [United States] is too quick to sacrifice the interests of 
American museums to help secure the cooperation of foreign nations in 
matters like drug trafficking and the war on terror.”236 
Though some of the pro-coin collecting lobby claims are wrong-
headed at best, there appears to be some foundation for the belief that 
U.S. antiquities policy is focused more towards appeasing valuable polit-
ical allies rather than on protecting artifacts and archaeological sites. 
Statements from U.S. officials as well as treaties and initiatives consum-
mated between the two countries attest to the close relationship between 
Cyprus and the United States, particularly in relation to the U.S. wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In 2006, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eura-
sian Affairs, Daniel Fried, said in a public address, “Cyprus is an impor-
tant friend and a key partner on vital issues such as security and counter-
terrorism.”237 Furthermore, “[t]hroughout the wars in Afghanistan and 
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Iraq, Cyprus has provided over-flight and landing rights to U.S. aircraft 
and port access for U.S. ships.”238 During this time, “[a]pproximately 800 
U.S. military flights have used Cyprus’s airports, transporting troops and 
cargo to Iraq.”239 Finally, in his remarks at the MOU signing ceremony, 
U.S. State Department Under Secretary Nicholas Burns made reference 
not only to Cypriot aid in evacuating 15,000 Americans from Lebanon 
during its civil war, but also to Cyprus’ current status as an important 
partner in U.S. foreign policy.240 He stated, 
Cyprus, of course, is also a partner in our war to keep—in our efforts to 
keep the world peaceful and stable. Cyprus was the very first member 
of the European Union that signed a bilateral ship boarding agreement 
under our Proliferation Security Initiative, which has become our flag-
ship operation to try to help prevent the spread of terrorism in the 
world.241 
Together, these statements and agreements demonstrate the close politi-
cal ties between the two countries. It also suggests that the United States 
might equate appeasing Cyprus’ retentionist policies with winning the 
“Global War on Terror.” 
Another area where the United States is apparently seeking to curry 
Cyprus’ favor is the entry of Turkey into the European Union. Turkey 
has long been an important American strategic ally and its most impor-
tant ally in the Muslim world.242 But, recent events, in particular the Iraq 
War, have strained the relationship between the two countries.243 In order 
to strengthen its ties with Turkey, the United States is seeking to aid the 
Mediterranean State by endorsing its application for EU membership.244 
Of the factors delaying Turkey’s possible acceptance, the “Cyprus Ques-
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tion” is one of the most prominent.245 Part of this problem is the Greek-
Cypriots’ reluctance to unify the island. In 2004, Greek-Cypriots voted 
down a referendum, which Turkish-Cypriots approved, to reunite the 
island.246 Additionally, Cypriot representatives have continually thwarted 
EU attempts at ending northern Cyprus’ isolation.247 However, after a 
new Greek-Cypriot president was elected in 2008, the island’s Greek and 
Turkish factions have begun to restart reunification talks.248 Could the 
United States be working in the background to help move this process 
along? And, if so, did the generous MOU, even if only subconsciously, 
help “grease the wheels”? 
The above factors suggest that rather than purely seeking to protect 
archaeological materials in an effective way, the United States is using 
the CPIA to gain political capital, which it can use to carry out its other 
goals, such as the “war on terror.” 
CONCLUSION 
Though unprecedented, the inclusion of Cypriot coins in the U.S. 
MOU with Cyprus is simply another example of an attempt by the inter-
national community to protect archaeological sites from looting and arti-
facts from losing their all-important context. Regardless of the type of 
object being regulated, the current U.S. approach to antiquities protection 
is highly flawed. Although interested parties, including academics and 
commentators, have proposed several alternative regimes, the existing 
system persists. It is possible that, given time and stronger enforcement, 
the CPIA will become an effective tool against the global looting of an-
tiquities. But as Prohibition, the “War on Drugs,” and similar enforce-
ment regimes that rely on strict import restrictions demonstrate, such 
measures are not always effective. Furthermore, without addressing the 
critical matter of standardizing provenance information no regime can 
hope to succeed. It is also self-evident that no matter what protection 
scheme is favored, its effectiveness would increase exponentially as the 
number of States that adhere to it increases. If only the United States re-
stricts the import of Cypriot coins, there are still buyers available in other 
States such as France, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
Every party with an interest in the protection of archaeological sites 
should seek wide-reaching international solutions. 
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This suggests the political motivations of the MOU; if the United 
States is concerned with actually protecting antiquities it would take 
steps to create a multilateral regime that more effectively addressed the 
international antiquities market, rather than solely utilizing agreements 
consummated with individual States. The debate over antiquities protec-
tion by the United States is marred by the suggestion that the United 
States may be using MOUs as a carrot to gain political capital. This the 
United States should not do, because it ignores the important place that 
archaeological information holds in the human experience. 
Because Cypriot coins have proven to be a flash point on which propo-
nents on either side of the dealer/collector and archaeologist/source 
country divide have focused their attention, they may serve to promote 
important change. Over the course of this often-heated debate, both sides 
have been forced to reevaluate the effectiveness of the CPIA and the im-
portance of legislative protection for antiquities. Vocal commentators 
from both points of view have suggested fostering a “forum for construc-
tive dialogue,”249 and coupled with the continued mainstream media at-
tention devoted to the issue, this development may prove critical for the 
evolution of global antiquities protection. Coin collector groups have 
filed Freedom of Information Act lawsuits in order to shed light on the 
CPIA evaluation process. This may help reveal the extent to which the 
process is politicized. 
In an online post, Rosenbaum addressed the importance of developing 
a “ceasefire in the cultural-property wars.”250 It appears that the attention 
garnered by restrictions on Cypriot coin importation may be an important 
factor in achieving this goal, and the debate may serve as a stepping-
stone to more effective global antiquities protection schemes. 
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